Condoleezza Rice declared "a really big change in American foreign policy." Although the concept of 'national interest' at first appears self-evident, upon a more thorough analysis, it is one riddled with ambiguity and juxtapositions. This is perhaps even more so in American foreign policy, where the United States finds itself very active in the affairs of the world. This project examines the notion of national interest from a uniquely American perspective. While defining interests often proves to be a descriptive rather than prescriptive task, the ensuing discussion proposes that enduring issues provide a starting point from which to examine interests as a process, rather than an end-state. In conclusion, it will develop a caution to strategists regarding long-term planning decisions, given that the United States' ability to project decisive, physical power abroad is synonymous with the Americanized concept of self-defense.
THE NOBLEST FORM OF POWER: IMPLICATIONS FOR 21st CENTURY STRATEGY
America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one.
-President George W. Bush, 2005 Inauguration Speech Self-coined as his "freedom speech," President George W. Bush Although the concept of "national interest" at first appears self-evident, upon a more thorough analysis, it is one riddled with ambiguity and juxtapositions. This is perhaps even more so in American foreign policy, where the United States, in its selfanointed role as "the city upon a hill," continuously finds itself very active in the affairs of the world. 4 This project examines the notion of national interest from a uniquely American perspective in order to provide context for analyzing the current National Security Strategy. While defining American interests often proves to be a descriptive rather than prescriptive task, the ensuing discussion offers that enduring issues provide a solid starting point from which to examine interests as a process, rather than an endstate. In conclusion, it will develop a caution to strategists regarding long-term planning decisions, given that the United States' ability to project decisive, physical power abroad is synonymous with the Americanized concept of self-defense.
An American Perspective on Interests
The notion of national interest has been a central premise in American policy since the framers of the Constitution envisioned a government designed to protect and promote common interests in the New World. 5 Charles E. Hughes, Secretary of State during the Harding-Coolidge presidential administration, explained, "Foreign policies are not built upon distractions. They are the result of practical conceptions of national interest arising from some immediate exigency or standing out vividly in historical perspective." 6 Interests are thus the mechanisms that drive the machine of foreign policy. Unfortunately, one cannot simply dissemble the machine and scientifically examine its components in order to map the policy process. The mechanisms themselves fluctuate and vary with circumstance so greatly, that although many of their properties are immutable, the variance produces a seemingly arbitrary output at times.
With such ambiguity, examining the idea of national interest usually produces descriptive rather than prescriptive results. With this caution, it is still accurate to posit that a nation's interests drive foreign policy and that examining the origin and matter of the former is indeed essential to comprehending the strategic nature and implications of the latter.
The concept of national interest is most often understood as the core tenant within the international relations theory of "political realism." Fathered by German-born political theorist Hans Morgenthau, his seminal work, Politics Among Nations, sought to explain international politics through objective laws rooted in human nature in order to rationalize decisions in a world comprised of competing interests and conflict.
Morgenthau defined national interest in terms of power and explained that nation-states survive within an anarchical system through the rational and systematic application of their military and industrial power against other nation-states. 7 As critics readily point out, however, this realist-based conception distorts foreign policy into pure power politics, absent of moral or value-based preferences. Morgenthau himself acknowledged as such, opining that "there can be no political morality without prudence." 8 In contrast, idealists believe that nations should conduct themselves in accordance with transcendent ideals and that political leaders should focus on purpose more than power. 9 There is a belief that universal abstract principles, rather than a balance of power, can create political order among nations. Defining the term national interest in any practical sense is a difficult task.
Foreign policy expert Paul Seabury offers, "The national interest may be regarded as those purposes which the nation, through its leadership, appears to pursue persistently Given the broad-brush strokes inherent in the notion of national interest, it is perhaps best to view the national interest as a continual process rather than as a set of absolutes. Political scientist Harvey Hoffman explains this when he aptly states, "The national interest is not a self-evident guide, it is a construct." 29 Paul Seabury offers that the national interest is "a kaleidoscopic process by which forces latent in American society seek to express certain political and economic aspirations in world politics." 30 Seabury further explains, "If one regards the national interest as a conglomeration of purposes fashioned in a system of political power, change, and conflict, one sees it then as malleable, plastic, provisional, the "step-child" of a governmental process." 31 In addition to the complications created from an infinite number of variables, it is also impossible to distinguish between the often ambiguous and contradictory nature of decisions that appear grounded in both self-interest and ideals. Thus while there may exist a tangible set of criteria or components that are inherent in the concept of national interest, the notion itself is most practical to strategists and policy makers when utilized as a place of origin from which to then apply context and circumstance. In other words, the idea of national interest can only serve as a starting point, not an end state.
The notion of an American national interest is best viewed as a construct, a process in determining foreign policy that is both value and power-based, as well as temporally and contextually dependent. There is still considerable value in attempting to categorize levels of a nation's interests, however, in order to provide a more accurate starting point from which to formulate policy decisions. Hans Morgenthau offers a simplistic yet useful categorization for national interests as either vital or secondary.
Examined within the context of determining when a nation should go to war, his realist perspective defines vital interests as those non-negotiable issues involving "security as a free and independent nation and protection of institutions, people, and fundamental values." 32 By default, secondary interests include everything else and thus are more difficult to identify given that "mutually advantageous deals can be negotiated" since they do not threaten the state's existence or the internal nature of its character. Afghanistan. 35 Nuechterlein defines a vital interest as an issue "so important to a nation's well-being that its leadership refuses to compromise beyond the point that it considers tolerable." 36 He argues that this differs from survival in that a nation has time to engage in discourse, pursue alternate courses of actions, and perhaps demonstrate the consequences that might result from the action. Nuechterlein's fundamental premise is that "A vital interest exists when a country's leadership believes that serious harm will come to the country if it fails to take dramatic action to change a dangerous course of only be categorized and understood after the event has occurred based on the actions a nation pursued. Michael Roskin explains this when he warns that secondary interests "...can grow in the minds of statesmen until they seem to be vital." 39 Michael Handel further complicates this issue by explaining "whenever political or military leaders feel certain of success…they will find a convincing explanation as to why the contemplated action protects and enhances the vital interests of their country." 40 Given the inability to define practically the concept of national interest or present explicit categorizations that accurately link intensity levels to political actions, then perhaps it is best to examine the utility of national interest within a construct of enduring interests. Categories of long-term, essential interests, although perhaps overly broad in nature, can then serve as foundational pillars from which to vary levels of intensities depending on circumstance.
Even when attempting to catalog enduring national interests, there is no absolute consensus among political scientists. However, the similarities greatly outweigh the differences. For example, Donald Nuechterlein outlines four long-term interests that guide policy makers: defense of the homeland, economic well-being, a favorable world order, and promotion of values. 41 Terry Deibel also groups national interest into four broad categories: physical security, economic prosperity, value preservation at home, and value projection overseas. 42 Deibel differs from Nuechterlein in that he views physical security and value preservation as two distinct categories, whereas many theorists believe the latter is an integral component of survival and defense. 43 Robert Art expands the list to six interests: defense of the homeland; deep peace among great powers; secure access to Persian Gulf oil at a stable, reasonable price; international economic openness; democracy's consolidation and spread, and the observance of human rights; and no severe climate change. 44 While Art goes into detail, providing specific means within groupings, his first five categories align with Nuechterlein and
Deibel's broader strategic descriptions.
The notion of a national interest contains an inherent tautological component that can seemingly permit one to define it as anything that a nation considers to serve its purpose. Specifically concerning waging war, military historian Martin van Creveld accurately points out that this path "is as self-evident as it is trite." 45 The concept has to have enough substance that it provides boundaries for understanding international
relations and preferably direction to analyze and formulate strategic policy. Through the preceding discussion, it is apparent that the national interest is a concept that is often ambiguous and vague and that the power of context can significantly alter its level of intensity and heavily influence the courses of action pursued by a nation's leadership. By establishing and maintaining a military with the capability to project decisive forces forward, the United States has capitalized on this strategic opportunity and thus has the unique ability among the great powers to pursue its national interest on foreign soil, far away from the homeland.
Maintaining a favorable world order is a principal means with which the United
States addresses threats to its national interests, primarily concerning physical security. What then is the difference between the Bush administration's idealistic strategy "to protect the security of the American people" and previous attempts at a 'Wilsonian' approach to foreign policy? 47 The difference is not in the notion that the spread of democracy and its principles can improve stability and security and thus create political order among nations. Rather, the difference is in the methodology to achieve those lofty goals. The 2006 National Security Strategy is founded on two pillars: "promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity" and "confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies." 48 While the document acknowledges the threat from traditional military armed forces, it offers only that the United States "will provide tailored deterrence" against traditional nation-states and it will balance its military capabilities against traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive events. 49 The result, largely based on the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, has been a significant shift in the anticipated role for military forces in support of the pillars that form the nation's new security strategy. More importantly, Gray provides stern counsel to strategists and policymakers when he clearly warns, "terrorism does not threaten our civilization, but our over-reaction to it could do so." Although their intensity will vary depending with circumstances, there is, nevertheless, a prioritized set of enduring national interests, the utmost of which is the nation's moral obligation to secure its physical survival and preserve its internal character and values. As history has shown in the last century, the American preference is to pursue proactively its interests abroad, far from the homeland. Although a unique form of American idealism has been entrenched throughout its foreign policy, the United
American interventions on the European continent during both
States has never faltered on its obligation to defend its citizens. The tragic events of the Twin Towers was both a wake-up call and unambiguous example of the damage extremists can inflict on even the greatest of nation-states, but this event should only further reinforce the priority of the nation's enduring interests. The caution to all involved in the strategic decision-making process is that long-term defense planning decisions, such as program acquisition and force structure, not only provide the resources to support the nation's enduring interests in what they predict as the future strategic environment; the decisions themselves actually shape that very future. Despite the best efforts and perhaps purest of intentions, these are unfortunately not so much predictions about what threats or crisis the nation will inevitably face, but in the choices that the nation will have at hand to respond.
Conclusion
"In politics force is said to be the ultima ratio. In international politics force serves, not only as the ultima ratio, but indeed as the first and constant one." 61 As Kenneth
Waltz highlights, the threat of force permeates all foreign policy, during times of peace and war, obligating nations to analyze the risks of a prospective policy and weigh them against probable benefits. Thus, even the seemingly static composition of a military, in terms of organization, capability, doctrine, for example, factors into these ongoing
calculations. An adversary with a formidable blue-water navy or long-range nuclear missile force provides a significantly different set of variables for a nation to consider than an infantry-centric land power with minimal strategic projection; the former can credibly threaten most nations, while the latter is restricted to intimidating its geographic neighbors. While a nation has varying forms of power or resources available to promote its interests, or foreign policy-diplomatic, informational, military, and economic to use a commonly accepted construct-it must be understood that the threat of force, whether existential or explicit, remains a nation's unremitting influence in the international arena.
President Theodore Roosevelt's dispatch of the Great White Fleet in 1907 to circumnavigate the globe perhaps symbolized the true beginning of America's major role in international politics. It is not happenstance that this primarily diplomatic endeavor fell to the military arm of the nation. Military strength clearly demonstrates a nation's power, and it is power that allows a nation to achieve its interests, whether these are to negate a threat or "make the world safe for democracy."
The primary threats to American interests continue to emanate from outside the Western Hemisphere. Thus, it serves the nation's interests to promote a stable, favorable world order, not only to fulfill its seemingly ordained role to promote freedoms and liberties, but as a means for the nation to secure its most fundamental obligationthe physical and ideological security of its populace. Nothing in this composition is meant to imply that the United States should not seek and support the spread of democracies or defend the rights of liberty, justice, and human dignity across the globe.
It should simply serve as a reminder that the nation's enduring interests are prioritized, and that historically, the American preference is to secure the defense of the nation by shaping, influencing, and controlling events well outside its borders. While the ongoing crises have focused the nation's attention on international democratic reform, strategists must remember that the future is uncertain and the best one can hope for is to develop a long-term strategy that is operationally flexible and minimizes the risk of strategic failure when the enemy votes.
It would serve the nation well to remember Winston Churchill's profound caution:
"The human race cannot make progress without idealism, but idealism at other people's expense and without regard to the consequences of ruin and slaughter which fall upon millions of humble homes cannot be considered as its highest or noblest form." 
